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This study investigates whether non-financial Latin American firms adjust their capital 
structure in order to maintain certain rating levels. The credit rating-capital structure 
(CR-CS) hypothesis suggests that firms assume less debt after rating downgrades, 
aiming to retrieve necessary conditions to restore a better rating. Through panel data 
analysis for the 2000-2014 period and by using the generalized method of moments 
(GMM), we show that a rating downgrade does not accelerate the speed of adjustment 
to the target, indicating that firms do not target minimum rating levels, as predicted by 
the CR-CS hypothesis. Although, rating changes are related to firms’ capital structure, 
we conclude that Latin American firms do not adjust their capital structure to maintain 
certain rating levels. 
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O presente estudo verifica se as empresas latino-americanas não financeiras ajustam 
a sua estrutura de capital com a finalidade de manter determinado rating de crédito. 
Segundo a hipótese “credit rating-capital structure” (CR-CS), as empresas diminuem 
o nível de endividamento após um rebaixamento de rating, visando restabelecer as 
condições necessárias para retomar o rating anterior. Por meio da análise de dados 
em painel para o período de 2000 a 2014, utilizando-se do método dos momentos 
generalizados, os resultados mostram que um rebaixamento de rating não acelera a 
velocidade de ajuste em direção ao endividamento-alvo, indicando que as empresas 
não buscam atingir níveis mínimos de rating de crédito, como prediz a hipótese CR-
CS. Embora o rating de crédito tenha apresentado relação com a estrutura de capital 
das empresas latino-americanas, conclui-se que elas não ajustam a estrutura de 
capital a fim de manter determinado rating. 
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Efeitos do rating de crédito sobre a estrutura de capital das empresas latino-americanas  
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The issue is relevant for investors, creditors, and regulatory bodies because such 
agents face decisions based on the credit rating. Investors and creditors should 
consider the lower relevance of credit rating in decisions to allocate their resources 
in Latin American firms. The governments as a regulator on the capital market would 
monitor the dependence on debt for companies with credit downgrades, as it seems a 
combined effect in national context.
Pratical implications
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1 INTRODUCTION
Credit ratings serve two purposes: they certify the firm’s current financial condition (initial credit rating) 
and signal a change in the firm's financial choices (rating changes, i.e., upgrades and downgrades) (Cornaggia, 
Krishnan & Wang, 2017; Fracassi, Petry & Tate, 2016). The maintenance of a good credit rating provides benefits 
to a firm mainly associated with a reduction in its cost of capital. In contrast, a credit rating downgrade may 
trigger a re-negotiation between the firm and its fund suppliers that might affect the subsequent interest rates 
charged by creditors, resulting in increased coupon rates on bonds and high costs of accessing capital markets or 
issuing securities (Wojewodzki, Poon & Shen, 2017; Agha & Faff, 2014). In this context, is the interest in benefits 
(or in avoiding costs) associated with the maintenance of certain rating levels likely to influence managerial 
decisions? Studies carried out primarily among United States firms suggest so, indicating an influence of credit 
rating on capital structure decision-making (Agha & Faff, 2014; Kemper & Rao, 2013; Michelsen & Klein, 2011; 
Hovakimian, Kayhan & Titman, 2009; Kisgen, 2009; Kisgen, 2006; Grahan & Harvey, 2001).
The credit rating-capital structure (CR-CS) hypothesis proposes that firms that are facing an imminent 
rating change or have suffered a rating downgrade make more conservative capital structure decisions, in the 
sense of assuming less debt (Kisgen, 2006). According to Kisgen (2006), firms target minimum rating levels, and 
a rating downgrade predicts capital structure decisions better than changes in leverage. Huang and Shen (2015) 
found results consistent with the CR-CS hypothesis, in which downgraded firms adjusted their capital structure 
more rapidly than non-downgraded firms, especially in developed countries.
In Latin America, rating change announcements have a significant impact on stock prices in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (Freitas & Minardi, 2013), but its effects on capital structure decisions are still incipient 
(or neglected) in these countries. Rogers, Mendes-da-Silva, and Rogers (2016) presented evidence that credit 
rating changes are not determinants of capital structure in Latin American firms. However, the authors analyzed 
this relationship believing that companies can predict the imminence of a rating reclassification and not considering 
the impact on capital structure after rating changes.
We aim to identify whether publicly traded non-financial firms in the leading Latin American countries 
(Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Peru) promote adjustments in their capital structure to maintain certain 
rating levels. To this end, we assessed the firms’ capital structure after different rating changes (maintenance, 
downgrades, and upgrades), using the model of partial adjustment to target leverage proposed by Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) to test the trade-off theory behavior. We add to the model of Flannery and Rangan (2006) a 
representative variable of credit re-rating, similar to Kisgen (2009). If the credit rating is not relevant to firms’ 
capital structure decisions, then rating changes should not influence subsequent capital choices. The sample period 
for the tests is 2000 to 2014.
This study contributes to the literature by providing a better understanding of credit rating relevance 
and hence the accuracy of the CR-CS hypothesis in Latin American firms, given the more recent process of 
development of capital markets compared to developed countries. Freitas and Minardi (2013, p. 442) emphasized 
that international investors consider Latin America in their portfolio as a whole instead of a single country. Besides, 
the growth and development of the Latin American capital market have attracted more investors, and consequently, 
higher coverage of the rating agencies, especially since 2004 (Freitas & Minardi, 2013).  
Our results show that even though rating downgrades influence the firms' capital structure in Latin 
America, firms do not target minimum rating levels as predicted by the CR-CS hypothesis. We conclude that 
financial decisions targeting leverage levels are more representative in the capital structure of Latin American 
firms than financial decisions targeting minimum rating levels since the acquisition of resources is a first-order 
necessity compared to maintaining a certain rating level.
The next section defines the research hypotheses, besides summarizing the theoretical framework on 
credit rating and capital structure. Section 3 describes the methodological procedures employed and identifies the 
data, variables, and analysis models. Section 4 presents the analysis of the results. The last section contains our 
final considerations and conclusion.
T. B. Paschoal; M. da C. Gomes; M. R. do Valle / Rev. Cont Org (2019), v. 13: e154005 3
2 CREDIT RATING AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
2.1 Hypotheses
The credit rating relevance for capital structure decision-making was documented by Graham and Harvey 
(2001) in a comprehensive survey with North American chief financial officers, who indicated the preservation 
of credit rating as the second primary concern to determine corporate leverage. Motivated by this finding, Kisgen 
(2006) conducted the seminal empirical investigation of credit rating influence on capital structure by analyzing 
debt and equity issuances of firms that were in the imminence of credit re-rating. According to the credit rating-
capital structure hypothesis, initially formulated in Kisgen (2006) and consolidated in Kisgen (2009), firms bound 
to achieve a rating upgrade should issue less debt relative to equity to favor conditions to obtain the upgrade. 
Likewise, firms near a rating downgrade should adopt the same position, but in this case, aiming to avoid a 
downgrade. 
Kisgen (2009) relied on two different models of capital structure decision to evaluate the impact of credit 
rating changes. First, rating changes (upgrades and downgrades) were inserted as explanatory variables to explain 
the firms’ net debt issuance, making his model similar to that adopted in Kisgen (2006), but analyzed from the 
perspective of the decisions made after the rating changes. Additionally, Kisgen (2009) included the rating changes 
variables in a partial adjustment model of capital structure to the target leverage. Both models allowed assessment 
of a re-rating impact on the subsequent debt level, and the latter also enabled evaluation of the rating impact on 
target leverage balance of the capital structure. 
The results corroborated the CR-CS hypothesis’ propositions, suggesting a reduction of more than 2.0% 
in leverage, as a percentage of assets, compared with non-downgraded firms. For rating upgrades, in turn, the 
results indicated no impact on subsequent capital structure decisions. Finally, analysis of capital structure balance 
showed that a downgrade accelerates the adjustment toward the firm’s target leverage, whereas an upgrade will 
not influence the pace of adjustment. 
We investigate the following three hypotheses based on the CR-CS hypothesis’ propositions:
H1: The balance of the capital structure toward target leverage occurs more rapidly for downgraded firms. 
H2: Downgraded firms are more likely to promote a subsequent reduction in debt level compared with 
non-downgraded firms.
H3: A credit rating upgrade does not influence subsequent changes in the capital structure.
2.2 Empirical evidence
Hovakimian et al. (2009) investigated the existence of target credit rating levels, as well as their influence 
on capital structure. According to the authors, although firms are often subject to shocks that lead them to deviate 
from their target ratings, they will make financing choices that allow them to move back towards their rating 
targets if rating concerns are relevant. To assess this assumption, the authors revisited traditional studies on target 
leverage and added analysis of deviations relative to target rating levels. The results demonstrated that firms make 
decisions regarding debt issuance and repurchase aimed at maintaining the target capital structure. However, firms 
are more likely to issue equity rather than debt when the rating level is below the target, as well as when debt 
is above the desired level. The opposite, however, was not found to be accurate, indicating that the above-target 
rating, as well as below-target leverage, does not influence the firms’ capital structure decisions.
Michelsen and Klein (2011) re-evaluated capital structure decisions near credit rating changes, but with 
a more representative sample, composed of firms from the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. 
The results obtained by Michelsen and Klein (2011) reinforce the propositions of the CR-CS hypothesis. First, 
the relationship verified for imminent upgrades and downgrades is not symmetrical, being more intense near 
a downgrade. That is, the possibility of rating downgrade induces an economically more conservative capital 
structure policy than that observed for a possible upgrade, reinforcing that managers target minimum rating levels. 
Also, the authors found that the CR-CS hypothesis effects are economically more significant in countries with 
broader capital markets, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France.
 Using a similar approach to that of Michelsen and Klein (2011), Kemper and Rao (2013) analyzed 
capital structure decisions of United States firms, but unlike the previous studies based on observation of seasonal 
variations, the authors analyzed quarterly changes in the capital structure. 
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Kemper and Rao (2013) found that firms responded differently to the possibility of rating upgrades and 
downgrades. Whereas firms near a rating upgrade issued less debt relative to equity, those near a downgrade issued 
more debt, contradicting the results of Hovakimian et al. (2009) and Michelsen and Klein (2011). The authors 
argued that if the rating was a first-order managerial concern, the possibility of a rating downgrade should induce 
a more conservative capital structure.
There are also studies that have explored legal and institutional issues, such as Huang and Shen (2015) 
and Wojewodzki, Poon, and Shen (2017). Huang and Shen (2015) investigated how cross-country variations in 
institutional variables affect the relationship between rating changes (downgrades and upgrades) and firms’ capital 
structure. The authors found that downgraded firms expedite the adjustment speed, corroborating Kisgen (2009) 
and Michelsen and Klein (2011) and that the leverage ratios adjust faster in stable legal and institutional countries. 
In a similar study, Wojewodzki, Poon, and Shen (2017) found that in countries with a more market-oriented 
financial system, the impact of credit ratings on firms’ capital structure is more significant and the adjustment is 
faster.
Rogers, Mendes-da-Silva, Neder, and Silva (2013) and Rogers et al. (2016) investigated the relevance of 
credit rating on capital structure in Latin American firms based on the approach adopted by Kisgen (2006). The 
results did not confirm the CR-CS hypothesis’ propositions, indicating that the proximity of credit re-rating does 
not influence capital structure. According to Rogers et al. (2013, p. 336), it is possible that credit re-rating outlook 
does not affect the capital structure of non-financial Latin American firms. However, the authors analyzed the issue 
without considering the impact on capital structure after rating changes.
Unlike Rogers et al. (2016) and Rogers et al. (2013), this study uses the CR-CS hypothesis’ propositions 
to verify the effects of credit rating changes on capital structure of Latin American firms after different ratings 
changes, considering that firms assume less debt after rating downgrades aiming to retrieve necessary conditions 
to restore a better rating. The present study broadens the understanding of the CR-CS hypothesis concerning 
the behavior of the Latin American firms since the institutional environment of these firms differ from more 
economically developed markets, such as those studied by Kisgen (2009, 2006).
3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Data and sample
We use the accounting and financial databases by Thomson One system (Thomson Reuters). The initial 
search included data from 876 publicly traded non-financial firms in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Peru, 
during the period 1999-2014, of which only firms with a credit rating and without missing values were maintained 
for the composition of a balanced sample. The final sample consists of 97 firms. The period for the tests is 2000 
to 2014.
The final sample is composed by 32 Brazilian firms, 27Mexican firms, 20 Chilean firms, 10 Argentinean 
firms, and 8 Peruvian firms. The assessment was performed using the long-term domestic issuer credit rating, the 
most widely used by firms, designated by the agencies Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s, whose ratings are 
available in the Thomson One system. This study comprises 850 rating records, including 333 credit re-ratings that 
occurred during the survey period, with 146 downgrades (17% of the rating records) and 187 upgrades (22%). Table 
1 shows the distribution of assigned ratings-year and rating changes (downgrades, upgrades, and maintenances) by 
country and sector (see also Appendix A).
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Raw 
materials
Consumer 
goods Industry Services 
Oil & 
Gas Telecom Utilities Total
Brazil
Downgrade 4 2 0 0 3 1 18 28
Upgrade 22 2 8 0 5 3 46 86
Maintenance 47 5 15 0 6 3 83 159
Total 73 9 23 0 14 7 147 273
Mexico
Downgrade 7 8 14 11 0 0 0 40
Upgrade 6 13 11 14 0 2 0 46
Maintenance 26 64 20 26 0 12 0 148
Total 39 85 45 51 0 14 0 234
Chile
Downgrade 2 9 4 0 1 5 14 35
Upgrade 3 4 1 4 0 3 14 29
Maintenance 21 18 10 5 14 18 50 136
Total 26 31 15 9 15 26 78 200
Argentina
Downgrade 0 0 0 0 19 4 19 42
Upgrade 0 0 0 0 7 2 9 18
Maintenance 0 0 0 0 16 4 35 55
Total 0 0 0 0 42 10 63 115
Peru
Downgrade 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Upgrade 3 1 3 0 0 0 1 8
Maintenance 3 1 2 0 0 0 13 19
Total 7 2 5 0 0 0 14 28
Total
Downgrade 14 19 18 11 23 10 51 146
Upgrade 34 20 23 18 12 10 70 187
Maintenance 97 88 47 31 36 37 181 517
Total 145 127 88 60 71 57 302 850
3.2 Definition of the variables and econometric models
Kisgen (2009) suggested that the effect of rating changes on capital structure may be verified using the 
model of partial adjustment to target leverage proposed by Flannery and Rangan (2006) to test the trade-off theory. 
The model was developed to indicate the existence of target leverage based on the adjustment speed toward the 
target ratio, since convergence does not occur ultimately, but partially over time, due to the presence of adjustment 
costs (Flannery & Rangan, 2006). According to the trade-off theory, target leverage optimizes the relationship 
between the costs and benefits of debt, promoting maximization of firm value (Myers, 2001).
The utilization of this method aims to verify the effect of rating changes on capital structure balance. 
Table 2 presents the variables used in this study. Debt Ratio is the dependent variable, and Rating Downgrade 
and Rating Upgrade are the independent variables. As control variables, we used Firm Size, Growth Opportunity, 
Profitability, Fixed Assets, Depreciation Expenses, Research & Development Expenses, a dummy for Research & 
Development Expenses, and Sectorial Debt Ratio.
Table 1. Assigned credit ratings and rating changes by country and sector
Source: Prepared by the authors.
T. B. Paschoal; M. da C. Gomes; M. R. do Valle / Rev. Cont Org (2019), v. 13: e1540056
Variables Definition/Calculation
I. Dependent Variable
Debt Ratio = Total Debt
i,t
 / Total Assets
i,t
II. Independent Variables
Rating Downgrade = Dummy variable that assumes value 1 when rating is downgraded and 0 otherwise
Rating Upgrade = Dummy variable that assumes value 1 when rating is upgraded and 0 otherwise
III. Control Variables
Firm Size = Natural logarithm of Total Assets
i,t
 deflated 
Growth Opportunity = (Net incomet – Net incomet-1) / Total Assetsi,t
Profitability = Earnings Before Interest and Tax
i,t
 / Total Assets
i,t
Fixed Assets = Fixed Assets
i,t
 / Total Assets
i,t
Depreciation Expenses = Depreciation Expenses
i,t
 / Total Assets
i,t
Research & Development Expenses = Research & Development Expenses
i,t
 / Total Assets
i,t
Dummy for Research & Development = Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm did not report Research & Development Expenses and 0 otherwise
Sectorial Debt Ratio = Mean debt per sector-year 
Target leverage is not an observable characteristic, so it requires a model that allows its estimation. In this 
study, we adopted the model proposed in Flannery and Rangan (2006), which assumes target leverage as a linear 
function of corporate factors associated with the capital structure, represented by equation (1):
DR*
i,t
 = α + βX
i,t-1
 + ε 
i,t 
    (1)
Where DR*
i,t
 is the target Debt Ratio (or target leverage); X
i,t-1
 is the vector of firm characteristics associated 
with the costs and benefits of different debt levels, β is the coefficient of X, and ε 
i,t 
 is the error term. The variables 
represented by X and their expected signs (in parentheses) are as follows: Firm Size (positive), Growth Opportunity 
(positive/negative), Profitability (positive), Fixed Assets (positive), Depreciation Expenses (negative), Research 
& Development Expenses (negative), Dummy for Research & Development (negative), and Sectorial Debt Ratio 
(positive/negative) (Kisgen, 2009; Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Fama & French, 2002).
Flannery and Rangan (2006) argued that the existence of adjustment costs (transaction costs associated 
with bond issuance) means that the capital structure is not entirely balanced but gradually balanced over time, 
following the equation (2). The expected value of λ, indicates λ = 0 no change in leverage between t-1 and t, and 
λ = 1 total balance to target leverage. Substitution of equation (1) in equation (2) then results in the model of partial 
adjustment to target leverage, equation (3):
DR
i,t
 - DR
i,t-1
 = λ(DR*
i,t
 - DR
i,t-1
)    (2)
DR
i,t 
= (1-λ) DR
i,t-1
 + (λβ)X
i,t-1
 + (λα) + λ ε 
i,t 
    (3)
Where DR
i,t
 is Debt Ratio (leverage); DR*
i,t
 is the target Debt Ratio (target leverage), λ is the adjustment 
coefficient, which shows the ratio between observed and desired debt level, X
i,t-1
 is the vector of firm characteristics 
associated with the costs and benefits of different debt levels, β is the coefficient of X, and ε 
i,t 
 is the error term. 
Equation (3) is used to test whether the balance of the capital structure toward target leverage occurs more rapidly 
for downgraded firms (H1).
Similar to the method used by Kisgen (2009), we assessed the adjustment coefficient (λ) conditional on 
credit re-rating using equation (3) in the total sample and three different sub-samples, composed of (i) firms-year 
after a rating downgrade; (ii) firms-year after a rating upgrade; and (iii) firms-year after rating maintenance. If 
the credit rating is an essential concern to the firm, the credit rating-capital structure hypothesis suggests a faster 
adjustment of the capital structure after rating downgrade compared with upgrade or maintenance. In contrast, if 
the credit rating is not a real concern, there would be no reason for changes in adjustment speed (Kisgen, 2009). 
Table 2. Variables used in the study 
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Furthermore, Kisgen (2009) suggested verifying the incremental effect of downgrades and upgrades on 
the subsequent debt, including them in equation (3), which now presents the following specification:
DR
i,t
 = Φ
1
Down
i,t-1
 + Φ
2
Up
i,t-1
 + (1-λ) DR
i,t-1
 + (λβ)X
i,t-1
 + (λα) + ε 
i,t
    (4)
Where Down and Up are dummy variables, λ is the adjustment coefficient, X
i,t-1
 is the vector for firm 
characteristics associated with the costs and benefits of different debt levels, β is the coefficient of X, and ε 
i,t 
is 
the error term. Equation (4) is used to test whether downgraded firms are more likely to promote a subsequent 
reduction in debt level compared with non-downgraded firms (H
2
) and to test whether a credit rating upgrade does 
not influence following changes in the capital structure (H
3
). 
We used dynamic panel data models through the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique. 
It is important to emphasize that in a context of dynamic panel data modeling, with the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors, the inclusion of the means in the model creates a correlation between the 
lagged dependent variable regressor and the error term, known as dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). In specifying 
the model of partial adjustment to target leverage, Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Kisgen (2009) addressed the 
dynamic panel bias with substitution of lagged debt ratio (in this case, at market value) by instrumental variables 
formed by the book value. However, this artifice is not possible in this study due to the absence of an alternative 
measure of the debt ratio, considering the unavailability of market value data.
Flannery and Hankins (2013) revised the results of Flannery and Rangan (2006), using estimators 
developed for dynamic panel data models, and demonstrated that the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) is the most consistent for finance studies, given the characteristics 
of regularly used data. In the authors’ opinion, this estimator “is reliable regardless of the level of endogeneity 
or dependent variable persistence and should be the default choice under these conditions, particularly if the lag 
coefficient is of interest” (Flannery & Hankins, 2013, p. 16).
Therefore, we adopted the partial adjustment model to target leverage with the same specification as 
Flannery and Hankins (2013), using of the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator, instrumental variables 
limited to a maximum of two lags, explanatory variables defined as predetermined, and inclusion of annual dummy 
variables to control for possible exogenous influences associated with specific periods, such as economic shocks.
4 ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
4.1 Previous analysis
Table 3 shows the distribution of re-rating records by level. Except for level A, all other available rating 
levels also present some reclassification: a downgrade, an upgrade, or both. The downgrades are fairly distributed 
across all levels, with most frequent occurrences for BBB (11 downgrades), B (13 downgrades), and Not Rated 
(31 events) - cases in which there was a loss in rating, treated as a downgrade because it exposed the firm to the 
same constraints. Upgrades, in contrast, are more concentrated across the macro-levels BBB, BB, and B, with 167 
occurrences, almost 90% of the cases.
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Rating levels Downgrade % Firms-year downgraded Upgrade
% Firms-year 
upgraded
Total of 
changes
A 0 0% 0 0% 0
A- 1 1% 6 3% 7
BBB+ 4 3% 15 8% 19
BBB 11 8% 17 9% 28
BBB- 8 5% 29 16% 37
BB+ 6 4% 25 13% 31
BB 7 5% 21 11% 28
BB- 5 3% 13 7% 18
B+ 7 5% 20 11% 27
B 13 9% 14 7% 27
B- 11 8% 13 7% 24
CCC+ 6 4% 5 3% 11
CCC 7 5% 5 3% 12
CCC- 9 6% 3 2% 12
CC 7 5% 1 1% 8
C 3 2% 0 0% 3
D 10 7% 0 0% 10
Not Rated 31 21% 0 0% 31
Total 146 100% 187 100% 333
Figure 1 shows firms’ average debt and the respective standard deviation about different credit rating 
classifications. The result of the t-statistic confirmed that the median debt ratio of level D is higher than all the 
others (at 1% significance level), indicating that the firms in default are the most leveraged. In contrast, firms 
rated at macro-levels B and BBB presented the lowest median debt ratio levels. In the case of North American 
firms, illustrated in Kisgen (2006), the relation between median debt ratio and credit rating levels presented linear 
behavior, ranging from lower average levels for the best ratings to the highest averages for the worst ratings.
Table 3. Changes in credit rating per level
Source: Prepared by the authors.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
A BBB BB B CCC CC C D Not Rated
Average Debt Standard Deviation
Figure 1. Average debt for broad rating
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Appendix B shows additional analyses. The higher mean debt observed before a rating downgrade could 
suggest leverage level as the reason for this change, given its impact on rating designation, which represents a 
consistent result according to the credit rating-capital structure hypothesis. However, maintenance of the same 
debt ratio also after downgrade suggests a different effect from that observed by Kisgen (2009), or an insufficient 
period for capital structure adequacy. Besides that, there is almost no change in firms’ capital structure when we 
segregated the overall average debt according to before (ex-ante) and after (ex-post) the rating changes (downgrade, 
upgrade and maintenance).
Figure 2 presents a more comprehensive perspective of debt ratio regarding to rating changes, with 
records of average corporate debt before, during, and after re-ratings. Interestingly, the curves suggest exactly the 
propositions of hypotheses H
2
 (reduction in leverage after a downgrade) and H
3
 (an upgrade does not influence the 
leverage). However, concerning H
2
, Figure 2 suggests that adjustment of debt ratio to rating downgrade requires a 
time interval longer than one year. Due to this characteristic, we also included the second year after a downgrade 
in the assessment of credit rating relevance.
Table 4 shows the average annual debt ratio variation, measured by the yearly difference of total debt as 
a proportion of total assets, comparatively at the moments after rating changes. Consistent with previous findings, 
the average annual debt ratio variation is positive in all scenarios, except for that observed after downgrades, 
indicating a reduction in debt ratio and agreement with hypothesis H
2
.
Obs. Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Average yearly debt variation 1,455 0.0110 0.1085 -2.4763 0.4978
- Post downgrades 137 -0.0056 0.0796 -0.3761 0.2025
- Post upgrades 177 0.0103 0.0829 -0.3777 0.3158
- Post maintenance 1,141 0.0131 0.1148 -2.4763 0.4978
Overall the results of this section suggest that corporate decisions are consistent with the CR-CS 
hypothesis (Kisgen, 2006; 2009), identified based on the following observations: (i) higher average corporate 
debt ratio before downgrades, (ii) subsequent gradual reduction in average debt ratio after downgrades, and (iii) 
predominance of capital structure decisions to reduce debt ratio after downgrades. Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that the high dispersion of the average values presented requires caution in interpreting these results, which are 
summarized ahead together with the empirical results and statistical rigor.
27%
29%
31%
33%
35%
t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Downgrade Upgrade
Figure 2. Average debt ratio in different years (t-1, t, t+1, t+2, and t+3), before and after rating change
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Table 4. Average annual debt variation: general and after re-ratings
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Note: Yearly debt variation = (Total Debt
i,t
–Total Debt
i,t-1
) / Total Assets
i,t
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4.2 Analysis of empirical results
Tables 5 and 6 summarize the estimation of the models of partial adjustment to the target leverage. 
The second column in Table 5 shows the results for equation (3) for the total sample, while the third, fourth, 
fifth, and sixth columns present the results for the base model estimated with the subsamples. The last column 
in Table 5 shows the results for equation (4), the base model transformed with the inclusion of the variables 
Downgrade and Upgrade. Table 5 presents the linear coefficient of each explanatory variable, followed by the 
z-statistic in parentheses. Table 6, in turn, gives the confidence interval (95%) of the lagged coefficient (β) of the 
Debt Ratio variable and the adjustment coefficient (λ) for each estimations just described. Note that according to 
the construction of the model, the adjustment coefficient is equivalent to λ = 1 – β.
Dependent variable: Debt Ratio
Equation (3) Equation (4)
Independent 
variables and fit of 
the model
Total 
sample
Sub-sample: 
Post-
downgrade 1
Sub-sample: 
Post-
downgrade 2
Sub-sample: 
Post-
upgrade
Sub-sample: 
Post-
maintenance
Total sample
Downgrade
i,t-1
- - - - - 0.021
- - - - - (2.54)**
Upgrade
i,t-1
- - - - - 0.004
- - - - - (0.65)
Debt Ratio
i,t-1
0.825 0.879 0.830 0.348 0.798 0.811
(17.02)*** (8.55)*** (7.44)*** (2.45)** (10.70)*** (16.03)***
Size
i,t-1
0.025 -0.001 0.015 0.001 0.018 0.022
(2.42)** (-0.12) (1.50) (0.05) (1.51) (2.55)**
Growth 
Opportunity
i,t-1
0.036 0.107 0.115 0.145 0.039 0.038
(2.25)** (2.16)** (3.14)*** (3.36)*** (2.29)** (2.42)**
Profitability
i,t-1
0.011 -0.081 -0.128 0.015 -0.002 0.026
(0.28) (-0.95) (-1.38) (0.14) (-0.03) (0.71)
Fixed Assets
i,t-1
0.024 0.033 0.128 -0.024 -0.006 0.023
(0.62) (0.35) (1.68)* (-0.41) (-0.12) (0.64)
Depreciation
i,t-1
-0.568 -0.279 -1.608 -0.095 -0.579 -0.654
(-1.03) (-0.36) (-2.05)** (-0.09) (-0.84) (-1.2)
Research & 
Development
i,t-1
1.908 -11.248 -6.322 -2.456 2.813 1.466
(2.51)** (-0.68) (-1.73)* (-0.63) (1.64) (2.00)**
Dummy Research & 
Development
i,t-1
-0.006 -0.039 0.023 -0.027 -0.002 -0.011
(-0.62) (-0.57) (0.79) (-0.48) (-0.13) (-1.18)
Sectorial Debt 
Ratio
i,t-1
0.143 -0.345 -0.224 -0.123 0.278 0.153
(1.27) (-1.01) (-0.87) (-0.24) (1.24) (1.36)
Constant
-0.524 0.191 -0.241 0.217 -0.355 -0.452
(-2.22)** (0.79) (-0.87) (0.57) (-1.28) (-2.26)**
No. of observations 1.358 137 130 177 1.044 1.358
No. of instruments 57 57 57 57 57 67
R2 0.723 0.744 0.777 0.517 0.739 0.732
Wald X2 715*** 830*** 585*** 136*** 294*** 723***
Test statistics (p-value):
AR(1) 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.121 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.466 0.110 0,110 0,872 0,245 0.518
Hansen 0.803 0.720 0.721 0.317 0.248 0.928
Table 5. Estimations for models of partial adjustment to target leverage 
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Note: For rejection of the null hypothesis of coefficient equal to zero: ***significance at 1%; ** significance at 5%; * significance at 10%.
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β β λ λ
(Debt Ratio
i,t-1
) (95% Conf. Interval) (1-β) (95% Conf. Interval)
Equation (3)
Total sample 0.825 0.730 0.920 17.5% 27.0% 8.0%
Sub-sample: Post-downgrade 1 0.879 0.678 1.081 12.1% 32.2% -8.1%
Sub-sample: Post-downgrade 2 0.830 0.611 1.048 17.0% 38.9% -4.8%
Sub-sample: Post-upgrade 0.348 0.070 0.626 65.2% 93.0% 37.4%
Sub-sample: Post-maintenance 0.798 0.652 0.944 20.2% 34.8% 5.6%
Equation (4)
Total sample 0.811 0.712 0.911 18.9% 28.8% 8.9%
The coefficient of the lagged Debt Ratio indicates an average annual adjustment of approximately 17.5% 
(1– 0.825) of the gap between current debt ratio and target leverage (Table 6). This adjustment rate, in turn, 
suggests that it takes more than five years for a typical firm to eliminate this gap. This result was very near the 
value of 15% obtained by Flannery and Hankins (2013), which was calculated using the same estimator and 
specifications adopted in this study, thus suggesting similar dynamics of capital structure balancing between the 
firms in the United States and Latin America. 
 The results of Table 6 indicate a reduction in the adjustment coefficient to the level of 12% in the first 
year after the downgrade and a return to the level of 17% in the second year. These results represent a rejection of 
the hypothesis H1, which supposes an increase in adjustment speed after downgrades.
On the other hand, it is worth noting in Table 6 that the adjustment dynamics of capital structure changes 
only after rating downgrades (post-downgrade 1 and post-downgrade 2) when the adjustment coefficient (λ) also 
presents negative values in the confidence interval (95%). This result indicates a change in typical convergence, 
characterized by (i) decreased debt ratio with target leverage increased, or (ii) reduced target leverage with 
increased debt ratio. In these cases, a decrease in the adjustment coefficient indicates not only reduced adjustment 
speed but also the “imbalance” of the capital structure, when the current debt ratio no longer converges to the target 
leverage. This circumstance is consistent with the CR-CS hypothesis and is explained by Kisgen (2009) by the 
fact that the target leverage does not consider, in its determination, the impacts of leverage on credit rating, or the 
impacts of rating on fundraising conditions. 
Kisgen (2009) reported a substantial increase in the adjustment speed of downgraded firms, with the 
annual balance ranging from approximately 35% to 63% gap reduction between current debt ratio and target 
leverage. However, this increase in adjustment speed is discussed by Kisgen (2009) only in the context of a 
subsequent reduction in the debt ratio. Under the CR-CS hypothesis, it is logical to consider an increase in 
adjustment speed after a downgrade if the capital structure balance is directed to a reduction of target leverage. 
Otherwise, considering the acquisition of resources as a first-order necessity, it would be reasonable to assume a 
reduction in adjustment speed towards capital structure balance, given the more restrictive conditions arising from 
the post-downgrade period. 
Our results indicate a substantial increase in the adjustment speed towards capital structure balance after 
a rating upgrade when the adjustment coefficient switches to the level of 65% gap reduction between current and 
desired debt levels (Table 6). The benefits of a rating upgrade could provide a favorable period for capital structure 
adjustments, as long as these benefits outweigh the transactional costs, as discussed in Kisgen (2009). 
In the case of firms whose ratings remained unaltered the previous year, the adjustment coefficient 
indicates an average annual reduction of 20% in the gap between the current debt ratio and target leverage. The 
confidence interval (95%) of the adjustment coefficient remains positive (Table 6), reinforcing the indication that 
the target leverage influences the capital structure balance of firms in the Latin American countries. However, a 
rating downgrade does not accelerate the speed of adjustment to the target, as predicted by the CR-CS hypothesis, 
contrary to the findings of Hovakimian et al. (2009) and Michelsen and Klein (2011) that firms target minimum 
rating levels.
Table 6. Confidence interval of the estimation results of the adjustment coefficient (λ)
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Re-rating impact on the subsequent debt ratio is presented in the last column of Table 5, which shows the 
result of the base model with the inclusion of Downgrade and Upgrade, (equation 4). The coefficient of Upgrade 
(Φ2 = 0.004) is not significant, confirming hypothesis H
3 
that a credit rating upgrade does not influence subsequent 
changes in the capital structure. The coefficient of Downgrade (Φ1 = 0.021), however, indicates an increase of 
about 2% in debt ratio, as a percentage of the total assets, after a downgrade (at 5% statistical significance). We 
reject hypothesis H
2
, as rating downgrade does not imply a subsequent reduction in the debt ratio.
Considering that the response time to downgrade may be longer than one year (see Figure 2), the results of 
the same estimation with two and three lags of Downgrade variable presented non-significant results (unreported). 
Moreover, the presence of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors was controlled as the coefficient 
of Downgrade was also estimated directly in the target leverage model. The result reinforces the evidences of a 
subsequent increase in debt ratio, of approximately 1.4% (at 10% significance).   
 Our results are similar to Kemper and Rao (2013) that firms issue more debt after rating downgrades, 
although it contradicts Kisgen (2009). According to Kemper and Rao (2013), this behavior could indicate that the 
acquisition of these resources is a firm’s first-order necessity, justifying their raising even in worse conditions. 
The absence of others funding sources or the most significant benefit of not target minimum rating levels 
(compared to the cost) explain such responses to rating changes, where the embryonic stage of development of 
financial markets (such as the capital market ) in Latin America could cause more dependence on the banking 
system as a funding source (Wojewodzki, Poon & Shen, 2017). These findings may also reflect the lower level 
of credit rating concern among Latin American managers compared with that of North American managers 
(Maquieira, Preve & Sarria-Allende, 2012).
The models proposed by Kisgen (2009, 2006) that gave rise to the CR-CS hypothesis are limited to 
explain why credit rating in Latin America does not impact the capital structure as in developed countries. 
Institutional characteristics such as bank-oriented financial system and the economic uncertainty of the Latin 
American countries affect not only the debt structure but also the credit rating changes (Michelsen & Klein, 2011). 
Therefore, the next step is to elaborate on a model that considers these aspects. Although the evidence is not in 
agreement with the CR-CS hypothesis' propositions, in consonance with Rogers et al. (2016) and Rogers et al. 
(2013), our results indicate that credit rating changes influence Latin American firms’ capital structure, but its 
effects are not associated with the maintenance of certain rating levels. 
5 CONCLUSION
Although credit ratings prevail in financial markets and are assigned to practically all firms issuing 
bonds, and have recognized the importance attributed by most observers of these markets, the economic and 
financial literature still in doubt about their significance and informational content. In this respect, ratings are often 
neglected in studies of determinants of capital structure (see Huang & Shen, 2015), and rarely investigated in 
emerging markets context (e.g., Rogers et al., 2016). There is still no consensus on the influence of credit ratings 
(and their changes) on firms’ capital structure. 
This study identified that rating changes have an impact on capital structure of Latin American firms, 
but not according to the CR-CS hypothesis. We found that a downgrade rating does not accelerate the speed of 
adjustment to the target capital structure, and downgraded firms do not promote a subsequent reduction in the debt 
level compared with non-downgraded firms. The downgraded firms remain more indebted than non-downgraded 
firms do after a credit rating downgrade. 
However, some of the CR-CS hypothesis prevail for Latin America. The reduction in adjustment speed 
observed after downgrades, initially not expected, is consistent with the CR-CS hypothesis when conditioned 
to a subsequent increase in the debt ratio. As expected, the occurrence of rating upgrades does not influence the 
following debt ratio level, despite the substantial increase observed in adjustment speed towards target leverage. 
Conceptual precepts of credit rating are also verified, i.e., the higher median debt ratio associated with the worst 
rating levels and before downgrades, consistent with the possibility that this is the reason for reclassification. We 
raise the need for a model that contemplates characteristics of the Latin American region related to the financial 
and economic system.
Therefore, Latin American firms do not adjust their capital structure to maintain certain rating levels. 
Therefore, Latin American firms do not target minimum rating levels, since the acquisition of resources is a first-
order necessity. 
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